,.^„.. 


IMAGE  EVALUATION 
TEST  TARGET  (MT-S) 


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A 


J 


// 


^ 

.*^^ 


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20 

1.8 


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Photographic 

Sciences 

Corporation 


23  WEST  MAIN  STREET 

WEBSTER,  N.Y.  14580 

(716)  872-4503 


CIHM/ICMH 

Microfiche 

Series. 


CIHM/ICMH 
Collection  de 
microfiches. 


Canadian  Institute  for  Historical  Microreproductions  /  Institut  Canadian  de  microreproductions  historiques 


cv 


Technical  and  Bibliographic  Notes/Notes  techniques  et  bibliographiques 


The  Institute  has  attempted  to  obtain  the  best 
original  copy  available  for  filming.  Features  of  this 
copy  which  may  be  bibliographically  unique, 
which  may  alter  any  of  the  images  in  the 
reproduction,  or  which  may  significantly  change 
the  usual  method  of  filming,  are  checked  below. 


D 


D 
D 


D 


Coloured  covers/ 
Couverture  de  couleur 


I     I    Covers  damaged/ 


Couverture  endommagie 

Covers  restored  and/or  laminated/ 
Couverture  restaurie  et/ou  pelliculAe 

Cover  title  missing/ 

Le  titre  de  couvertut'e  manque 

Coloured  maps/ 

Cartes  g6ographiques  en  couleur 

Coloured  ink  (i.e.  other  than  blue  or  black)/ 
Encre  de  couleur  (i.e.  autre  que  bieue  ou  noire) 


I      I    Coloured  plates  and/or  illustrations/ 


D 


Planches  et/ou  illustrations  en  couleur 


Bound  with  other  material/ 
Reli6  avec  d'autres  documentc 


Tight  binding  may  cause  shadows  or  distortion 
along  interior  margin/ 

La  reliure  serrie  peut  causer  de  I'ombre  ou  de  la 
distortion  le  long  de  la  marge  int6rieure 

Blank  leaves  added  during  restoration  may 
appear  within  the  text.  Whenever  possible,  these 
have  been  omitted  from  filming/ 
II  se  peut  que  certaines  pages  blanches  ajout6es 
iors  d'une  restauration  apparaissent  dans  le  texte, 
mais,  lorsque  cela  6tait  possible,  ces  pages  n'ont 
pas  6t6  film6es. 

Additional  comments:/ 
Commantaires  suppi6mentaires: 


L'institut  a  microfilmA  le  meilleur  exemplaire 
qu'il  lui  a  M  possible  de  se  procurer.  Les  details 
de  cet  exemplaire  qui  sont  peut-Atre  uniques  du 
point  de  vue  bibliographique,  qui  peuvent  modifier 
une  image  reproduite,  ou  qui  peuvent  exiger  une 
modification  dans  la  mithode  normale  de  filmage 
sont  indiquAs  ci-dessous. 


r~~|    Coloured  pages/ 


D 


Pages  de  couleur 

Pages  damaged/ 
Pages  endommagies 

Pages  restored  and/oi 

Pages  re&taur6es  et/ou  peilicul6es 

Pages  discoloured,  stained  or  foxe< 
Pages  dicolories,  tachet6es  ou  piquies 

Pages  detached/ 
Pages  d6tach6es 

Showthroughy 
Transparence 

Quality  of  prir 

Qualitd  indgala  de  I'impression 

includes  supplementary  materii 
Comprend  du  materiel  supplimentaire 

Only  edition  available/ 
Seule  Edition  disponible 


I      I  Pages  damaged/ 

I      I  Pages  restored  and/or  laminated/ 

r~l>  Pages  discoloured,  stained  or  foxed/ 

I      I  Pages  detached/ 

r~^  Showthrough/ 

Fyl  Quality  of  print  varies/ 

I      I  includes  supplementary  material/ 

I — I  Only  edition  available/ 


Pages  wholly  or  partially  obscured  by  errata 
slips,  tissues,  etc.,  have  been  refilmed  to 
ensure  the  best  possible  image/ 
Les  pages  totalement  ou  partiellement 
obscurcies  par  un  feuillet  d'errata,  une  peiure, 
etc.,  ont  6t6  film6es  d  nouveau  de  fapor  A 
obtenir  la  meilleure  image  possible. 


This  item  is  filmed  at  the  reduction  ratio  c:tecked  below/ 

Ce  document  est  filmi  au  taux  de  reduction  indiquA  ci-dessous. 

10X  14X  18X  22X 


12X 


± 


16X 


2CX 


26X 


30X 


24X 


28X 


22X 


ails 

du 

>difier 

une 

nage 


Th(t  copy  filmad  hara  has  baan  raproducad  thanks 
to  tha  ganarosity  of: 

Library  Division 

Provincial  Archives  of  British  Columbia 

Tha  imagas  appaaring  hara  ara  tha  bast  quality 
possibia  consldaring  tha  condition  and  lagiblllty 
of  tha  original  copy  ar.d  En  kaaping  with  tha 
filming  contract  spacifications. 


Original  copias  in  printed  papar  covers  ara  filmad 
beginning  with  the  front  cover  and  ending  on 
the  last  page  with  a  printed  or  illustrated  impres- 
sion, or  the  back  cover  when  appropriate.  All 
other  original  copias  are  filmed  beginning  on  the 
first  page  with  a  printed  or  illustrated  impres- 
sion, and  ending  on  the  last  page  with  a  printed 
or  illustrated  impression. 


The  last  recorded  frame  on  each  microfiche 
shall  contain  the  symbol  — ^  (meaning  "CON- 
TINUED"), or  the  symbol  V  (meaning  "END"), 
whichever  applies. 

Maps,  plates,  charts,  etc.,  may  be  filmed  at 
different  reduction  ratios.  Those  too  large  to  be 
entirely  included  in  one  exposure  are  filmed 
beginning  in  the  upper  left  hand  corner,  left  to 
right  and  top  to  bottom,  as  many  frames  as 
required.  The  following  diagrams  illustrate  the 
method: 


L'exemplaira  film*  fut  reproduit  grice  A  la 
ginArosit*  da: 

Library  Division 

Provincial  Archives  of  British  Columbia 

Las  imagas  suivantas  ont  AtA  reproduites  avac  la 
plus  grand  soin,  compta  tenu  de  la  condition  at 
da  la  nettetA  de  I'exemplaira  film«,  et  en 
conformity  avac  las  conditions  du  contrat  de 
filmaga. 

Les  exemplaires  originaux  dont  la  couvarture  an 
papier  est  imprimAe  sont  filmAs  en  commenpant 
par  la  premier  plat  at  en  terminant  soi.  par  la 
derniAre  page  qui  comporte  une  empreinte 
d'impression  ou  d'illustration,  soit  par  la  second 
plat,  salon  la  cas.  Tous  las  autres  exemplaires 
originaux  sont  film6s  an  commanpant  par  la 
premiere  page  qui  comporte  une  empreinte 
d'impression  ou  d'illustration  at  en  terminant  par 
la  darniAre  page  qui  comporte  une  telle 
empreinte. 

Un  des  symboles  suivants  apprraitra  sur  la 
darnidre  image  de  cheque  microfiche,  selon  le 
cas:  le  symbols  — ►  signifie  "A  SUIVRE  ",  le 
symbole  V  signifie  "FIN". 

Les  cartes,  planches,  tableaux,  etc.,  peuvent  dtre 
filmAs  d  des  taux  da  reduction  diffirants. 
Lorsque  le  document  est  trop  grand  pour  Atre 
reproduit  en  un  seul  clichA,  il  est  film6  A  partir 
de  i'angle  sup6rieur  gauche,  de  gauche  A  droite, 
et  de  haut  en  bas,  an  prenant  le  nombre 
d'images  n^cessaira.  Les  diagrammes  suivants 
illustrent  la  mithode. 


rata 


aiure. 


J 


22X 


1 

2 

3 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

tmmmmi^. 


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SPEECH 


or  T» 


HON.  WILLIAM  S.  ARCHER,  OF  VIRGINIA. 


THE  OREGON  QUESTION 


SBUriBBB 


IN    THE    SENATE    OP    THE    UNITED    STATES 


> 


MABOB  18y  18««. 


WASHlNOTONi 
OALES  AND  SEATON,  PRINTBRS' 

1846. 


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Mr.  ARCHER  said  that  it  had  seldom  occurred  in  the  lii^tory  of  the 
counrry  that  a  question  more  dennanding  honest  ind  fearless  discussion 
had  been  presented  in  Congress.  The  immediate  subject  of  controversy, 
a  territorial  claim  of  vast  extent,  was  important,  but  ihe  possible  issues  of 
the  decision  were  incomparably  more  so.  The  people  had  a  right  to  look 
for  a  fair,  not  one-sided,  exposition  of  the  merits  of  the  case,  and  true  char- 
acter and  posture  of  the  question,  at  our  hands,  disclosing  the  defects  as 
well  F.s  the  strength  of  the  claim  of  the  country,  the  impugning  as  well  as 
the  sustaining  considerations,  so  as  to  enable  them  to  render  a  sound  deci- 
sion ou  the  conclusion  to  which  their  Representatives  might  arrive,  by  the 
results  of  which,  as  they  might  be  affected  favorably  in  one  event,  so  they 
might  realize  very  mischievous  consequences  in  another.  Above  all  things, 
it  was  desirable  that  they  might  be  made  to  look  at  the  question,  divested 
of  any  of  the  prejudice  or  excitement  which,  if  not  previously  existing 
from  other  causes,  are  so  easily  awakened  and  so  eftective  in  communicat- 
ing distortion  and  false  color  to  national  disputes.  Yet,  what  had  we  wit- 
nessed in  the  treatment  of  this  question,  not  by  the  press  only,  but  in  the 
halls,  too,  of  legislation  ?  The  material  point,  our  exclusive  title  to  Oregon, 
assumed  on  the  ex  parte  arguments  of  advocates,  our  Secretaries  of  State ; 
the  joint  occupation  of  England  under  convention  represented  as  outrage, 
and  all  real  investigation  of  these  subjects  put  under  the  ban  of  an  obloquy, 
which  even  firm  men  might  be  well  reluctant  to  encounter,  of  collusive  de- 
fence of  a  claim  adversary  to  that  set  up  for  our  country,  in  co-operation 
with  a  foreign  Power.  Imputation  in  the  grossness  of  this  last  form  had 
not,  indeed,  been  directly  expressed  in  the  Senate  ;  but  even  here  the  ques- 
tion had  been  represented  as  no  longer  one  for  argument,  but  the  trial  of 
nerve,  patriotism,  and  sense  of  the  honor  of  the  country. 

Mr.  A.  brought  these  things  to  view  in  no  temper  of  offence,  however 
it  might  bo  justified,  nor  for  rebuke,  however  appropriate ;  but  for  admo- 
nition how  far  appeals  of  such  a  color,  leaders  of  such  a  temper  os  their 
authors,  were  to  be  followed  at  such  a  time.  The  resort  in  this  discussion 
was  not  to  the  people  ultimately,  as  in  ordinary  circumstances  and  cases, 
but  to  the  people  directly  now.  Opinion  was  known  to  be  undetermined — 
in  fluctuation.  It  was  to  be  moulded,  and  would  shape  the  eventual  dis- 
posal of  the  question  in  no  long  period.  If  influence  was  exerted ;  topics 
employed;  fact  or  argument  garbled,  colored,  distorted,  to  mystify  or  mis- 
lead, the  public  should  be  made  to  see  the  operation  ;  warned  to  be  fore- 
armed and  guarded.  For  his  own  personal  part,  (Mr.  A.  said,)  he  had  no 
right  to  complain  of  the  inuendoes  and  imputations  he  had  referred  to. 
He  confessed  himself  justly  open  to  them  to  a  great  extent.  He  admitted 
himself  deficient  in  nerve  to  involve  the  country  in  danger,  which,  from 
his  position,  he  was  not  to  partake,  or  suflfering  which  he  was  to  partake 
in  a  small  degree.  He  had  no  ambition  nf  the  cheap  patriotism  which  was 
to  be  purchased  by  invectives  against  England  in  all  seasons  and  places; 
and,  as  to  the  sense  of  national  honor,  he  disavowed  any  which  was  sepa- 


241415 


rated  from  justice.  We  heard  much  of  the  sentiment  of  Decatur,  "  Our 
country,  right  or  wrong."  If  it  meant  any  thing  more  than  that  we  were 
to  stand  by  our  country  at  all  events  in  war;  if  it  meant  that  we  were  to 
sustain  unjust  claims  if  asserted  for  our  country,  blind  her  to  their  true 
character,  and  carry  her  into  war  for  them  ;  if  these  made  the  import  of 
Decatur's  sentiment,  for  himself  he  abjured  it,  and  disclaimed  it  for  his 
country. 

The  debate,  (Mr.  A.  said,)  worn  out  as  it  was,  could  have  no  altructiou 
for  any  person.  His  purpose  in  partaking  it  was  to  do  what  he  did  not 
think  hud  yet  been  done,  at  least  with  sufficient  distinctness,  not  only  to 
strip  the  question  of  factitious  coloring,  but,  by  separating  it  from  consid- 
erations not  inherent  or  important,  to  exhibit  its  real  attitude  and  aspect. 
This  required  no  pursuit  of  detail,  brief  space  of  time,  or  argument,  to  ac- 
complish. Without  investigation  of  the  forms  of  resolutions  and  amend- 
ments on  the  table,  ihe  question,  reduced  to  substance,  was  the  great  one 
of  war  or  peace — war  for  all  Oregon,  peace  with  part.  These  were  the 
alternatives,  presented  naked.  Between  these  was  to  be  the  choice.  The 
Senator  from  Ohio  (Mr.  Allen)  had  professed  his  purpose  to  prepare  the 
hearts  of  the  people  for  war;  it  was  his  (Mr.  A.'s)  purpose  to  prepare  their 
minds  for  peace. 

[Mr.  Allen.  I  am  sure  the  Senator  does  not  wish  to  ascribe  to  me 
words  I  did  not  use.  I  take  this  occasion  to  repeat,  what  I  thought  I  had 
oftentimes  before  stated,  that,  in  answer  to  certain  remarks  made  by  the 
Senator  from  Massachusetts  with  regard  to  the  mode  this  Government 
should  adopt  of  quietly  debating  measures,  and  saying  but  little  about 
them,  I  replied  that  I  held  just  the  opposite  of  those  opinions;  that  I  be- 
lieved the  whole  state  of  the  question,  that  all  the  dangers  which  the  for- 
eign relations  of  the  country  threaten  to  its  peace,  should  be  fully  made 
known  to  the  country,  by  open,  full,  and  public  dealings.  And  I  remarked, 
in  connexion  with  that  subject,  if  it  was  essential  to  prepare  public  opinion 
and  the  minds  and  hearts  of  the  people,  by  the  frank  disclosure  of  the  reil 
state  of  the  Tacts,  they  ought  to  be  staled,  wheliier  war  or  any  thing  ol.je 
was  to  follow.  It  was  not,  therefore,  a  declaration,  made  independent  of 
other  questions,  that  I  wanted  to  throw  into  the  public  mind,  and  excite 
in  it  a  national  predisposition  to  war.  That  was  not  my  meaning,  as  the 
Senator  will  see;  and  I  am  sure  his  candor  and  justice  will  lead  him  to 
accept  this  explanation.  And  I  repeat:  I  take  not  back  one  syllable  of 
what  I  uttered  then.  It  is  printed  and  corrected  by  my  own  hand;  it 
stands  thsre,  and  I  abide  the  event,  whatever  it  may  be.] 

Mr.  Archer  resumed.  He  had  no  disposition  to  impute  to  the  Senator 
any  sentiment  he  disclaimed,  nor  any  intention  to  charge  hiui  as  the  reck- 
less advocate  of  war.  He  had  supposed  the  Senator  conceived  that  war 
would  be  demanded  by  the  exigencies  of  the  question,  and  had  therefore 
employed  his  expression  that  the  hearts  of  the  people  should  be  prepared 
for  war.  In  such  an  aspect,  so  they  ought;  and.  if  the  Senator  viewed 
the  question  in  that  aspect,  as,  with  his  opinions,  he  ought  to  view  it,  and 
if  consistent,  must  view  it,  he  was  right  to  employ  the  expression.  It 
was  his  duty  in  such  a  contingency  to  prepare  the  hearts  of  the  people  for 
war.  The  adoption  of  his  views  ought  to  sound  as  a  war  trumpet  through 
the  land.  It  was  because  he  (Mr.  A.)  did  not  partake  those  views,  regard- 
ed the  question  in  the  directly  contrary  aspect,  believed  that  nothing  could 
be  less  demanded  than  war,  however  it  might  be  brought  upon  us,  that  he 


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espoused  the  opposite  olTice,  invoked  the  preservation  of  peace,  and  desired 
to  prepare  (not  the  hearts,  which  he  hoped  were  prepared)  (he  minds  of 
his  countrymen  for  the  reception  of  these  opinions. 

The  question  wa^,  then,  of  war;  and,  if  it  came,  war  of  what  sort  ? 
To  he  estimated  in  its  mischief  by  men  slaughtered  or  ships  sunk  ?  This 
would  be  a  most  erroneous  view  of  the  subject  indeed.  No ;  it  would  be 
a  war  marked  by  the  largest  destruction  of  the  elements  of  human  pros- 
perity recorded  in  human  history.  It  would  be  marked  by  another  pecu- 
liarity— that,  to  the  account  of  injury  which  the  parties  should  sustain 
directly,  the  waste  and  impairment  of  resources  they  must  respectively 
incur  in  the  conduct  of  the  conflict,  must  be  added,  in  conclusion,  the 
amount  of  all  the  injury  of  l\\^  same  kind  they  would  inflict.  The  elements 
of  the  prosperity  of  the  contending  Powers  were  blended  in  a  luiion  which 
made  it  impossible  to  strike  them  apait,  so  that  the  blow  would  not  recoil 
on  the  hand  which  had  given  it.  The  hour  of  termination  of  the  conflict, 
the  day  of  the  restoration  of  intercourse,  must  come.  Suppose  our  ad- 
versary prostrate, sinews  worn  out,  resources  exhausted:  where  were  you 
to  look  again  for  the  resources  which  had  supplied  the  main  element  of 
your  growth  and  power,  and  which  would  be  so  much  wanted  for  their 
renovation  after  exertion  ? 

Our  declamations  were  habitual  on  the  subject  of  the  probable  destinies 
of  our  country  in  the  development  of  prosperity,  social  improvement,  and 
power.  And  on  this  point  it  seemed  ditfioult,  comparing  past  progres.s 
with  causes,  to  indulge  exaggeration  and  extravagance.  Realities  would 
be  transcended  ;  certainly  speculation  might  be.  But  the  mystery  of  this 
progress  of  development  was  a  talisman,  and  that  talisman  was  peace. 
On  peace  depended  the  expansion  of  commerce ;  on  this  expansion  de- 
pended the  growth  and  the  application  of  productions;  on  these  the  de- 
velopments of  prosperity,  improvement,  and  power — the  verification  of 
visions,  the  highest  interests  and  the  best  hopes  of  humanity. 

This  war,  then,  was  to  be  of  a  character  of  peculiar  destructivenesi;, 
should  it  come.  Would  it  come  ?  Here  was  a  territory  held  in  joint 
occitpancy  between  ourselves  and  Great  Britain  ;  the  question  of  title 
suspended  for  thirty  years.  At  whose  instance  ?  Onrs!  The  proposition 
of  this  state  of  things  had  come  from  us,  and  had  been  resisted  in  the  first 
stiggestion  by  Great  Britain.  Were  we,  in  these  circumstances,  to  seize 
the  whole  subject  of  controversy,  adjust  the  dispute  by  the  strong  hand, 
and  deal  thus  with  a  Power  the  most  rapacious,  we  were  told  by  those 
who  incited  us  to  this  course,  and  the  most  arrogant  as  well  as  the  most 
formidable  in  the  world?  Would  the  most  contemptible  Power,  the  least 
excitable,  submit  to  it?  Was  the  rapacity  which  sought  indulgence  in  all 
quarters,  armed  with  the  most  formidable  power,  to  have  the  poss3ssion 
already  iu  its  grasp  torn  away?  The  arrogance  which  never  submitted 
to  law  or  restraint,  to  lie  down  passive  and  quiet  under  this  contumely? 
Was  all  this  reversal  of  nature  to  take  place — Canute  giving  law  to  the 
wave?  But  this  was  manifestly  the  only  condition  of  peace,  if  we  carried 
our  claim  over  all  Oregon.  Was  there  question,  then,  whether  we  were 
to  have  war  in  this  event? 

When  nations  incurred  war  in  the  era  of  civilization  to  which  the  world 
had  arrived,  important  related  questions  were  presented  for  their  own  con- 
sideration and  that  of  the  world.  He  had  reference  to  no  general  decla- 
mations on  the  anti-christian,  the  immoral  character  of  war.    He  knew  that 


*  f~t 


6 


theso  (Icclnmatioiu,  however  entitled  to  regard,  weighed  for  nothing.  But 
others  there  were  which  did  weigh,  oirnriiig  themselves  for  discussion,  in 
regard  to  this  and  all  war,  which  would  form  part  and  parcel  of  the  judgment 
to  be  pronounced  on  it.  Would  the  war  be  a  war  provoked  on  the  part  of 
our  adversary  ?  Would  it  be  a  war  necessary  for  the  attainiusut  of  its  al- 
leged purpose,  or  even  conducive  to  it  ?  Would  it  be  a  war  consistent  with 
the  obligations  of  the  national  faith  and  reputation  ?  Would  it  be  a  war 
for  something  which  certainly  belonged  to  us,  without  which  it  could  not 
be  just  war  ?  And,  finally,  would  it  he  a  war  of  which,  even  in  success, 
the  fruits  would  be  advantageous?  These  were  the  inquiries  which  hd 
meant  (Mr.  A.  said)  to  review,  and  to  every  one  of  which  he  had  no  fear 
but  that  lie  should  be  able  to  prove  a  negative,  and  a  clear  one.  And  then 
it  would  be  for  the  people  to  say  whether  thev  would  have  a  war  of  such 
a  character  for  the  difference  between  the  whoie  of  Oregon  and  the  far  most 
valuable  part,  of  \\hich  wo  already  occupied  the  larger  share,  and  could 
have  the  remainder  if  we  elected  to  settle  the  controversy  by  amicable  di- 
vision and  adjustment. 

Would,  then,  this  be  a  war  provoked  by  our  adversary  ?  It  had  been 
seen  already  that  the  two  conventions,  in  virtue  of  which  the  territory  of 
Oregon  had  been  held  for  thirty  years  in  a  joint  occupancy  between  this 
country  and  England,  had  been  entered  into  on  the  proposition  of  our  ne- 
gotiators. In  the  instance  of  the  formation  of  erch  of  these  arrangements, 
it  had  been  declined  in  the  first  suggt^stion,  by  the  negotiators  on  the  part 
of  England,  and  yielded  only  to  the  reiteration  of  our  instances.  If  Eng- 
land were  in  possession,  then,  of  any  of  our  rights  in  Oregon,  the  fact  of 
this  possession  was  not  to  be  imputed  to  her,  nor  could  the  continuance  of 
that  possession  constitute  provocation  to  us.  She  had  in  no  respect  de- 
parted from  the  terms,  or  violated  the  intendment,  or  intruded  upon  the 
conditions,  or  complained  of  the  operation,  or  impugned  the  character  of 
these  arrangements,  which  we  had  put  upon  her.  She  had,  indeed,  pur- 
sued her  people  in  Oregon  with  protection,  in  the  form  and  the  measure 
she  was  authorized  to  do — not  beyond  them;  and  she  made  no  obstruction 
to  the  exercise  of  the  same  extent  of  privilege  on  our  part,  professing  to 
have  no  objection  to  offer  to  it.  The  compacts  between  us  may  stand  for 
her.  If  to  be  disturbed,  ours  is  to  be  the  disturbing  hand,  and  this  hand 
to  seize  the  whole  subject  of  controversy,  as  the  form  of  the  disturbance. 
This  will  hive  been  tlie  mode  and  source  of  the  provocation  to  war,  if  it  is 
to  come. 

Next,  will  it  be  war  required  for  its  object,  the  obtention  of  Oregon,  or 
even  be  conducive  to  it  ?  No  man  denies  that  Oregon  is  under  a  process  of 
migration  and  settlement  on  the  part  of  the  people  of  this  country,  whicu 
must,  in  no  long  time,  secure  to  us  the  whole.  Our  people  go  there  by 
thousands,  the  English  by  units;  and  the  disproportion  augmenting  in  our 
favor  every  year,  under  the  rights  of  the  common  occupation.  What  more 
effective,  more  assured  process  for  obtaining  the  whole  country,  thinly  oc- 
cupied as  it  is  by  English  subjects,  than  this  ?  As  was  well  remarked  by 
the  Senator  from  South  Carolina,  (Mr.  Calhoun,)  if  we  go  into  war  for  all 
Oregon,  we  may  come  out  with  none  of  it.  But  can  we  fail  of  getting  all, 
if  the  process  of  occupation,  under  the  right  of  joint  occupancy,  is  to  ope- 
rate for  us  with  a  thousand  times  the  effect  it  does  for  our  adversary,  and 
the  proportion  of  effect  varying  each  year  in  our  favor  ?  We  may  Jose  the 
country  by  war ;  we  must  gain  it  by  peace.    If  we  go  to  war  in  these 


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j  circumstances,  will  not  the  appearance  be,  and  the  fair  conclusion,  that  it 
is  the  war  we  aim  at,  (it  may  be  for  other  causes,)  and  not  the  territory  ? 

No  iin|)cachment  of  this  inference  can  be  drawn  from  the  suegestion, 
that  oui  people  going  in  such  numbers  to  Oregon,  we  are  under  obligation 
to  '*'^'!ow  them  with  protection.     Certainly  !     And  what  is  to  obstruct  our 
doing  so  in  the  fullest  manner,  with  no  disturbance  to  the  present  state  of 
things?     What  is  the  guaranty  of  security,  good  order,  legal  protection,  in 
;  all  forms  and  extent,  which  we  are  not  at  full  liberty  to  give  under  the 
convention  ?     What  is  the  single  reserve  to  the  completeness  of  this  dec- 
laration— the  solitary  franchise  which  we  are  under  obligation  to  withhold  ? 
But  one — the  allodial  title  to  the  settlements  our  people  may  make — the 
grant  of  title  deeds  !     And  of  what  consequence  is  this  to  them  ?     Have  not 
all  our  Territories,  now  foimins?  so  many  States,  been  first  occupied  and 
S3ttled  in  the  same  condition  ?     The  settlers  preceding,  the  portions  of  land 
selected,  the  confirmation  and  full  ascertuinmont  of  title  following  in  due 
lime,  in  full  time — that  is  to  say,  as  soon  as,  from  the  multiplication  of  oc 
cupants,  there  may  be  dangers  of  collisions  in  occupation.     Have  our  pi- 
oneer population  in  the  Territories  any  fear  on  the  subject  of  their  rights 
of  pre-emption  ?     Will  iliey  have  any  difficulty  in  obtaining  the  titles  on 
them  ?     Has  not  the  disposition  to  favor  this  class  of  our  citizens  run  noto- 
riously into  abuse  ?     Wo  promise  preemptioners  titles  before  they  settle. 
They  have  never  had  cause  of  dissatisfaction — never  been  incommoded 
by  delay  of  their  full  titles.     What  is  there  to  hinder  us  from  promising  the 
emigrants  to  Oregon  similar  confirmation  of  title  when  our  conventional 
arrangements  put  us  at  liberty  ?     In  the  interval,  there  is  no  authority  to 
disturb  their  possession  and  improvement,  which  is  valid  under  the  con- 
vention, and  differs  from  property  in  full  title  in  nothing  but  the  form  and 
the  name.     There  can  be  only  a  single  source  of  disturbance  of  their  pos- 
session and  eviction,  letting  loose  in  their  territory  a  force  superior  to  their 
capacity  of  resistance ;  ani  this  can  only  be  the  bequest  (as  probably  it 
would  be)  of  war  to  tlieiri.     The  unquestionable  interest  of  the  settler,  in 
this  respect,  runs  with  the  unquestionable  interest  of  the  Government. 

Then  this  war  will  no  more,  if  it  occur,  be  a  war  required  by  or  condu- 
cive to  its  object,  than  it  will  have  been  a  provoked  war.  It  will  be  not 
only  a  war  not  necessary,  but  adverse  to  occasion  and  necessity;  without 
pretext  to  give  a  color  to  it.  Next,  will  it  be  war  consistent  with  na- 
tional faith  and  reputation  ? 

Our  alleged  clear  and  unquestionable  title  to  the  whole  is  made  the  justifi- 
cation of  the  seizure  of  the  whole  territory.  Let  the  unquestionable  title  to 
the  whole  be  conceded,  still  the  conclusion  will  not  follow  from  this  assump- 
tion. Why  ?  Another  element  romes  in  to  intercept  and  qualify  the  con^ 
elusion.  Our  title  goes  back  to  the  dates  of  our  conventions.  In  1818,  in 
1827,  we  alleged  we  had  full  title.  Then  we  had  the  power  to  alienate, 
transfer,  or  recognise  modified  title  in  others.  We  might  have  made  re- 
linquishment or  transfer,  in  whole  or  part,  fully  or  under  modification.  Have 
we  not  done  so  to  Great  Britain  ?  If  we  propose  to  her  a  joint  occupancy ; 
force  it  on  her  acceptance ;  permit  it  to  continue  thirty  years ;  in  the  inter- 
val offer  four  times  a  division  nearly  equal  of  the  territory;  press  at  these 
several  times  this  proposition — does  all  this  amount  to  no  relinquishment 
of  part  of  our  supposed  full  right  to  the  grantee  and  recipient  of  so  much 
concession  ?  Is  it  to  be  construed  as  involving  no  recogisition  of  right  of 
ome  character,  to  some  extent?    Suppose  it  were  to  be  held  as  only  an 


8 


argument  of  comity,  concession  to  the  advuntugtis  ol  conimorct)  witli  Great 
Britain,  or  the  love  of  peace — does  not  ihe  same  argument  of  high  policy 
apply  now  ?  The  same  considerations  of  interest  or  of  reputation,  are  they 
not  entitled  to  weight  now,  if  they  were  en'iiled  to  it  formerly,  at  the  in- 
ception of  the  conventions? 

If  he- were  asked,  then,  (Mr.  Archeb  said,)  where  was  Great  Britain  to 
find  a  claim  to  set  up  against  the  United  States,  his  answer  was,  if  not  from 
discovery  or  Spain,  or  elsewhere,  from  the  United  States.  If  Gray  gave  us 
good  title  to  the  whole  country,  or  Spain  distinct  from  him,  or  France  by 
treaty,  or  Lewis  and  Clarke  by  exploration,  or  Astor  by  settlement,  or 
England  by  restoration  of  Astor's  settlement,  we  had  all  these  grounds  and 
forms  of  title  as  complete  as  we  have  now  when  we  made  our  last  conven- 
tional concession  in  1827.  What  is  all  ground  of  title  to  any  thing,  to 
property  in  any  form  ?  Conventional  recognition.  By  this  private  properly 
is  held— on  this  basis  national  rights  repose,  and  derive  from  it  their  au- 
thority. On  this  basis  England  has  a  claim  to  participation  in  this  territory. 
He  thought  this  her  only  ground  of  just  claim  north  of  Vancouver's  island 
and  Frazer's  river. 

It  would  not,  then,  as  he  (Mr.  A.)  thought,  consist  vvith  the  concessions 
we  had  made  to  England,  with  the  faith  which  was  implied  in  those  con- 
cessions, and  the  reputation  for  upright  dealing  in  all  things,  which  was 
worth  more  than  Oregon,  to  set  up  pretensions  which  would  exclude  Eng- 
land entirely  from  Oregon. 

He  had  been  placing  the  argument  on  this  point  (Mr.  Ahcher  said)  on 
the  assumption  that  our  title  in  1827,  when  we  made  the  last  convention 
with  England,  was  undoubted  to  the  whole  of  Oregon ;  and  he  had  been 
contending  that  still  there  were  imperative  considerations  rehitive  to  the 
position  in  which,  by  that  convention,  we  had  placed  ourselves,  requiring 
abatement  at  our  hands  of  this  extreme  pretension.  But  the  more  direct 
question  intervened.  Were  we  invested  in  fact  with  this  indisputable  title 
to  the  whole  of  Oregon  ?  It  was  matter  of  delicacy  to  draw  into  question 
a  claim  which  had  been  set  up  for  one's  country  -,  but  it  was  matter  of 
much  higher  obligation  of  duty  not  to  permit  our  country  to  be  plunged 
into  war  on  false  grounds  of  claim,  in  ignorance  of  their  inadequacy,  and 
from  want  of  exposure  of  this  fact.  The  delicacy  and  the  ditficnlty,  liow- 
ever,  in  this  case  admitted  of  reconcilement.  The  essential  part  of  the 
claim  of  our  country  did  rest  on  valid  title.  It  was  the  part  of  inconsidera- 
ble value,  of  value  far  below  the  cost  of  asserting  it  by  force,  which  alone 
would  be  lost  by  compromise  through  division,  the  title  to  which  was  lia- 
ble to  be  impugned.  The  removal  of  the  persuasion  of  title,  as  regarded 
this  part,  would  be  a  service,  not  a  disservice,  to  the  coiuitry. 

What  he  proposed,  then,  on  this  part  of  the  subject,  was  the  examina- 
tion of  the  extreme  claim  which  had  been  asserted  to  the  parallel  of  lati- 
tude of  54°  40'.  If  he  could  succeed  in  disproving  that,  then  the  way  was 
left  open  to  adjustment  by  division  of  the  territory,  the  exact  conditions  of 
the  division  remaining  the  subjects  of  arrangement  by  negotiation. 

The  claim  asserted  to  the  line  of  54°  40'  rested  for  its  support  entirely 
on  the  title  of  Spain,  which  had  become  the  subject  of  concession  to  us  by 
the  treaty  with  that  Power  of  1819.  No  other  of  our  alleged  grounds  ol 
title  ranged  to  that  extent.  In  removing  this  ground,  therefore,  the  object 
which  he  (Mr,  A  )  had  in  view,  of  restricting  our  claim  within  this  ex- 


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9 


tremo  exlonsion,  and  so  allowing  room  for  compromise  by  division  of  the 
country,  would  be  edectcd. 

Did  the  Spanish  lillo,  then,  give  us  the  oxtrnnic  claim  we  founded  on  it? 
Was  this  form  of  our  title,  as  alleged,  invulnerable?  Ridicule  hud  been 
attempted  to  be  cust  on  this  title  of  Spain,  as  d>  rived  under  the  Pa^^al  bull 
of  1792,  which  made  partition  of  all  newly  discovered  countries  between 
Portugal  and  Spain.  He  (Mr.  A.)  did  not  regard  this  ridicule  as  ju.st.  All 
modes  of  title  in  property,  as  he  had  already  had  occasion  tu  say,  traced 
back  to  conventional  arrangement  in  some  form.  Th  -•  was  as  true  of  the 
national  as  the  municipal  forms  of  properly.  An  assignation  of  property 
by  the  Pope  was  us  much  entitled  to  observance  and  respect  as  any  other, 
if  men  and  nations  agreed  that  this  should  be  ilie  established  mode  of 
assignation  of  title.  It  wa.s  the  fact  of  the  agr<;ement,  not  the  reasonable- 
ness, which  gave  the  character  of  law  and  the  force  of  obligaiion  to  the 
arrangement.  In  this  predicament  of  fact,  a  title  from  the  grant  of  the 
Pope  would  be  as  valid  as  any  other  which  tliu  suuie  foundation  of  ascer- 
tained consent  could  establish  among  natir>ns.  The  object  of  all  rules  was 
to  exclude  controversies,  have  peace  j  aii.l  any  rule  distinctly  assented  to 
and  recognised  was  good.  The  defect  of  the  title  of  the  grant  under  the 
Pope  was,  that  it  had  never  huu  assent,  except  of  the  two  immediate  par- 
ties to  reap  the  benefit;  and  therefore  never  attait;ed  to  the  cliaracrer  of  :• 
rule  of  public  law.  From  an  early  period,  afie.r  annunciation,  it  hud  been 
conteamed  and  disregarded.  All  the  cstui)lishmenis  on  the  .\tlantic  side 
of  the  North  American  continent  had  been  fuinided  in  contempt  of  it,  and 
therefore  it  was  that  it  was  null. 

Had  the  Goverrunenl  of  Spain  any  better  title  to  the  norlhwestern  coast 
of  America?  Undoubtedly  the  vessels  of  this  Power  were  the  first  to  sail 
along  the  coast  to  a  point  higher  than  the  line  of  54°  40'  of  north  latitude. 
If  this  might  be  called  discovery,  (one  of  the  admiltt  d  sources  of  title  to 
waste  torritories  and  countries.)  was  it  ever  perfected  in  the  mode  which 
the  validity  of  title  from  this  source  demands?  It  is  matter  notorious  and 
undeniable  that  it  was  not ;  hiis  never  been.  Settlements  made  by  Spain 
north  of  latitude  42'^  had  been  abandoned  certainly  before  the  transfer  of 
her  title  to  tis. 

Had  Spain  any  other  or  further  sanction  to  her  claim  of  tule?  She 
might  have  had  the  ground  of  prescription.  Claim  without  foundation, 
having  long  and  sufficient  acquiescence  to  uphold  it,  may  be  rendered  valid 
m  national  law,  as  in  municipal  law.  Tiie  title  of  Spain  to  tho  whole 
Pacific  coast,  on  the  ground  of  discovery,  had  been  always  asserted,  never 
acceded  to.  It  had  been  contested  by  England,  contested  by  Russia,  con- 
temned by  ourselves.  This  last  predicament  of  it  was  decisive  in  the 
present  discussion.  We  could  set  ifp  no  pretension  after  we  had  acquired 
it,  which  we  had  invalidated  before  it  had  been  acquired,  and  with  full 
knowledge  of  it.  This  was  the  case  inconlestably  with  the  title  of  Spain. 
We  offered  in  1818  to  make  a  disposition  in  full  title  of  the  whole  territory 
in  arrangement  with  England,  with  no  regard  to  the  title  of  Spain.  The 
Secretary  of  State  had  argued  that,  of  two  titles  acquired  separately,  one 
might  be  brought  to  sustain  the  other,  even  though  the  fir.st  had  been 
denied  before  it  was  acquired.  But  this  could,  iu  any  event,  be  Umi  only 
of  titles  wl.u  !i  Jid  not  stand  in  repugnance  to  each  other.  Now,  the  title 
which  we  Litmned  under  Gray  did  stand  in  this  repugnance  to  the  title 
which  we  h&d  acquired  under  Spain.     If  th»5  force  we  ascribed  to  the  dis- 


10 


covery  of  Gray  was  just,  Spain  had  no  antecedent  title.  If  she  had,  our 
claim  was  dishonest  intrusion  on  hers.  Right  by  Spanish  discovery  left 
no  room  for  our  right  by  subsequent  discovery.  Or  if  there  had  been  room 
for  right  by  our  discovery,  it  could  only  be  from  the  absence  of  right  under 
Spanifh  di«covery.  Gray  and  Heceta  could  not  both  give  claims  to  dis- 
covery of  the  same  river,  because,  supposing  either  valid,  one  must  have 
been  consummated  before  the  other  supervened.  Our  title  might,  indeed, 
be  indefeasible  under  either  take:i  separately,  and  our  people  elect,  there 
was  little  question,  to  stand  on  that  of  Gray. 

The  view  of  the  subject  which  excluded  the  Spanish  title  put  aside,  of 
course,  all  occasion  for  discussion  on  the  subject  of  the  Nootka  convention. 
But  supposing  otherwise,  there  had  been  very  undue  importance  attached 
to  this  Nootka  convention,  founded  on  what  seemed  to  him  (Mr.  A.)  a 
very  mistaken  apprehension  of  its  proper  character  and  import.  The  ar- 
gument of  the  Secretary  of  State  was,  that  the  whole  pretension  of  Great 
Britain  to  title  in  Oregon  rested  on  this  convention  with  Spain  ;  that  this 
convention  had  been  terminated  by  war  between  these  Powers;  and  that 
the  effect  of  the  subsequent  treaty  between  them  revived  treaties  of  com- 
merce only,  in  the  number  of  which,  that  convention  was  not  to  be  included. 
Ttie  conclusions  in  this  argument  did  not  require  to  be  examined,  as  they 
fall  with  the  basis  of  it.  The  pretensions  of  Great  Britain  were  not  de- 
rived from  the  Nootka  convention.  It  was  not  necessary,  to  support  this 
proposition,  to  refer  to  the  terms  of  the  convention,  which  did  not  sustain, 
or  to  the  preamble,  which  clearly  excluded,  any  such  deduction — the  terms 
carrying  no  import  of  the  concession  of  rights  by  or  to  either  party,  the 
preamble  importing  mutuality  of  arrangement,  which  excluded  the  idea  of 
such  concession.  The  very  fact  of  the  existence  of  the  convention  was 
conclusive  in  disproof  of  the  character  im[)Uted  to  it.  The  convention  was 
framed  in  termiuLition  of  a  controversy  which  had  proceeded  to  the  eve  of 
rupture  and  war.  Rupture  and  war  for  what  ?  The  breaking  up  of  an 
English  settlement  on  the  coast  by  Spain,  on  the  alleged  ground  of  its  in- 
trusion on  the  exclusive  jurisdiction  and  sovereignty  of  Spain.  Did  not  this 
vindication  of  a  right  of  settlement  by  England  import  the  denial  of  the 
exclusive  sovereignty  of  Spain  ?  And  the  effect  of  this  convention — was 
it  not  the  vindication  of  this  denial,  and  the  placing  it  on  impregnable 
ground  in  virtue  of  the  concessionary  arrangement  on  the  part  of  Spain 
which  the  convention  established  ? 

Why  should  En-jland  make  complaint  and  menace  war,  if  it  was  she, 
not  Spain,  who  had  connnitled  the  violation  of  jurisdiction  ?  What  else 
was  the  appeasatory  arrangiunent  of  the  convention,  but  an  admission  of 
injury  to  England,  and  that  injury  consisting  in  the  assertion  against  her 
of  the  claim  of  exclusive  jurisdiction  theretofore  of  Spain  ?  The  conven- 
tion then  established,  in  place  of  the  proposition  that  the  claim  of  England 
to  a  right  of  seitlcment  in  the  territory  had  been  derived  under  or  from 
Spain,  that,  on  the  contrary,  it  had  been  exercised  independently  of  Spain, 
and  against  her  ineffectual  eftbrt  to  resist  this  exercise,  successfully  asserted, 
and  vindicated  effectually.  The  language  of  the  English  negotiators,  in  the 
conduct  of  the  controversy  with  us  on  this  subject,  had  uniformly  been 
conformable  to  this  view  of  the  character  of  the  convention.  The  language 
of  the  English  commissioners  in  1826  was,  that  if  the  conflicting  claims 
with  Spain  had  not  been  "  finally  adjusted  by  the  Nootka  convention, 
*  and  all  arguments  and  pretensions  definitively  set  at  rest  by  the  signature 


11 


'  of  that  convention,  nothing  would  be  more  easy  than  to  demonstrate  that 

<  ihe  claims  of  Great  Britain  to  that  country,  as  opposed  to  those  of  Spain, 
'  were  so  far  from  visionary  or  arbitrarily  assumed,  that  they  established 
'  MORE  THAN  A  PARITY  OF  TITLE  to  the  posscssiou  of  the  couHtry  in  ques- 

<  tion,  either  as  against  Spain  or  any  other  naiion."  They  add,  th»t  the 
rights  of  Great  Britain  are  "  recorded  and  defined  in  the  convention.'* 
They  speak  of  them  as  "  fixed,"  never  as  created  by  the  convention  ;  treat- 
ing this  instrument  as  evidence  of  a  recognition  of  these  pretensions,  never 
as  importing  any  grant  or  institution  of  them. 

This,  then,  was  the  view  (said  Mr.  A.)  in  which  this  convention  was  re- 
garded by  Great  Britain,  and  in  which  she  was  authorized  by  the  circum- 
stances and  history  of  its  formation  to  regard  it.  But  the  inference  derived 
from  the  opposite  view,  that  this  instrument  was  to  be  regarded  as  the  ex- 
clusive source  of  the  British  claim  which  had  expired  in  its  extinction,  was 
the  sole  basis  of  our  extreme  claim  to  Oregon  to  the  latitude  of  54°  40'. 
In  the  failure  of  this  inference,  our  claim  in  this  extreme  extent  fell.  None 
of  our  other  grounds  of  our  claim  taking  it  to  this  extent,  it  was  not  re- 
quirod  (Mr.  A.  said)  by  his  purpose  to  institute  any  rigorous  examination 
oftl)em,  that  purpose  being,  by  showing  that  we  could  not  claim  clearly 
to  this  extent,  to  let  in  adjustment  by  arrest  of  the  claim  short  of  this  point. 
It  might  not  be  an  unadvised  course,  indeed,  when  the  question  was  of  the 
assertion  of  our  claim  by  the  extreme  mode  of  force,  to  look  into  every 
ground  assigned  for  it  with  narrowness,  to  have  assurance  of  its  impregna- 
bility. The  ground  of  title  from  the  discovery  of  Gray  had  been  that  'he 
most  insisted  on.  His  Iriend,  the  Senator  t>om  Maine,  (Mr.  Evans,)  had 
disclosed  perplexities  and  difficulties  surrounding  this  foundation  of  our 
claim  which  it  might  not  he  found  easy  to  resolve.  He  (Mr.  A.)  could 
suggest  others,  which  he  had  been  surprised  should  have  escaped  the  pene- 
trating observation  of  that  Senator.  He  (Mr.  A.)  chose  not  to  advert  to 
them,  with  the  exception  of  one  which  he  had  to  commend  to  the  attention 
of  the  patent  constitutional  coiistrnciioiiistsof  Democracy.  Their  doctrines 
recognised  no  substantive  power  in  our  Government,  wliich  was  not  found 
by  name,  was  not  directly  expressed,  in  the  Constitution.  The  power  to 
acquire  territory  had  been  regarded  as  of  a  character  so  highly  substantive 
as  lO  have  fixed  a  limitation  in  the  (.'onslitution  on  acquisition  in  even  the 
confined  form  and  extent  of  a  lew  acres  for  forts,  arsenals,  or  dock  yards. 
Even  this  moderate  exercise  of  the  power  was  submitted  to  the  consent  of  the 
State  Government.s.  In  what  mode  of  intcrprttation,  then,  was  to  be  derived 
the  huge  anomalous  faculty  of  acquiring  'vvelve  and  a  half  degrees  of 
latitude,  by  the  process  of  its  discovery  by  aii  individual,  and  he  not  acting, 
or  professing  to  act,  or  claim,  on  behalf  of  the  Government,  moie  than  by 
its  authority  ?  Discovery  was  not  one  of  tli^  titles  to  authority  to  be  found 
in  the  Constitution,  though  it  now  appeared  in  recent  construction  to  be  a 
very  large  one.  We  were  not  without  auth  irity,  indeed,  to  make  acquisi- 
tion of  territory  to  the  extetit  in  question,  under  the  Constitution.  But  the 
form  of  exercise  of  this  authority  was  by  treaty,  and  discovery  was  no  ex- 
ercise of  a  treaty  -making  faculty.  By  this  mode  of  treaty  and  its  sequences, 
he  (Mr.  Archer)  was  of  opinion  i.iat  we  had  acquired  impregnable  title 
in  Oregon.  It  did  not  reach  to  the  extent  of  latitude  54°  40',  however,  and 
presented,  therefore,  no  valid  obstacle  to  the  mode  of  compromise  by  di- 
vision of  the  territory,  as  the  only  available  avenue  to  adjustment  of  the 
controversy,  except  at  the  expense  of  consequences  of  far  greater  cost  than 
the  value  of  the  territory. 


0  7-^ 


1415 


12 


Mr.  Archer  went  on  to  say,  that  lie  persuaded  himself  that  he  had  not 
been  unsuccessful  in  establishing  the  propositions  he  had  announced  for  his 
discussion,  that  the  pressure  of  our  claim  to  the  whole  of  Oregon  would 
lead  lo  war;  that  the  war  would  not  be  one  provoked  by  any  offensive 
conduct  of  our  adversary ;  would  be  inconducive  to  its  object,  the  obtention 
of  Oregon ;  would  as  little  be  conducive  to  the  reputation  of  the  Govern- 
ment for  adherence  to  the  requirements  of  its  conventional  arrangements; 
and,  finally,  would  be  waged  for  a  claim  which  was  not  sustainable  in  the 
extent  to  which  it  would  be  asserted.  If  these  propositions  had  beer,  sus- 
tained, the  conclusion  could  not  be  resisted,  nor  made  a  subject  of  question, 
that  the  controversy  for  Oregon  ought  not  to  be  carried  to  the  resort  of  war, 
but  referred  to  a  less  violent  form  of  adjustment. 

And  now  he  wished  to  lead  attention  lo  the  consequences  which  might 
be  anticipated  from  this  war,  which  presented  to  his  inind,in  the  views  he 
had  been  led  to  take  of  them,  topics  for  the  gravest  and  most  anxious  re- 
flection. Ho  had  no  reference  in  this  allusion  to  the  ordinary  forms  of 
ca-nalty  and  injury,  the  characteristics  of  all  war,  especially  on  a  large 
scale.  These  were  heavy  enough,  surely,  in  persons  not  divested  of  so- 
briety by  the  presence  of  some  dominating  coNCKPrioN.to  induce  the  ex- 
tremest  forbearance  in  the  resort  to  war,  if  not  demanded  by  an  imperative 
exigency  of  national  interest  or  honor.  The  more  obvious  forms  of  the 
calamity  of  war — destruction  of  men  and  ships,  waste  of  money  and  prop- 
erly— had  the  least  claim  incomparably  in  estimating  the  amount  of  this 
calamity.  It  was  not  what  n-arked  the  progress  of  war,  but  the  sequel, 
that  had  the  first  claim  to  estimation.  Circumstances  attendant  on  the 
progress  pass  away;  t.hose  which  attached  to  the  sequel  ensured  for  long 
continued  influence.  And  such  were  going  to  be  the  circumstances  attach- 
ing to  this  war  with  England,  if  we  should  become  engaged  in  it. 

Some  of  these  circumstances,  the  most  obtrusive  because  the  most  essen- 
tial, it  was  his  purpose  (Mr.  A.  said)  briefly  to  consider.  He  was  in  no 
condition  to  expand  the  view  of  them,  however  they  might  merit  it.  He 
began  by  discarding  from  account  all  notice  of  military  or  naval  disasters 
or  loss.  He  believed  that  his  countrymen  would  always  be  found  sustain- 
ing fully  the  reputation  we  had  earned  in  naval  and  military  conflict ;  and 
that  in  this  war,  if  it  came,  they  would  add  largely  to  the  national  titles  to 
renown.  This  he  stated  from  the  fullest  conviction  and  belief  The  pur- 
poses of  his  argument  required  that  he  should  go  further  than  this  in  admis- 
sion. He  conceded  that,  with  no  interruption,  we  should  triumph  on  every 
wave,  be  the  victors  on  every  field ;  that  no  current  of  adverse  vicissitude 
or  accident  might  be  expected  to  come  athwart  the  stream  of  our  success 
to  break  it;  that  the  freest  vision  of  the  Senator  from  Ohio  (Mr.  Allen) 
on  this  subject  might  be  realized.  That  honorable  Senator  indulged  the 
impression  that  this  imbecile  Power,  England,  would  not  venture  on  war 
with  us  single-handed.  Why,  then,  single-handed?  Why  not  double- 
handed  ?  Was  not  the  favorite  theme  of  the  Senator  from  Ohio,  the  vigil- 
ant propensity  of  the  great  Powers,  in  alliance  with  England,  to  pounce 
on  this  seductive  exemplar  of  ours,  of  the  pernicious  vitality  and  perilous 
progressiveness  of  free  institutions,  to  extinguish  it  before  the  attempt 
might  be  too  late  ?  What  occasion  more  favorable  than  this  of  war  with 
England  for  the  indulgence  of  this  propensity  and  policy  ?  Then  the  prob- 
ability in  this  view  was  not,  as  the  Senator  supposed,  that  wo  should 


13 


have  no  war  with  England,  but  that  we  should  have  war  with  more  than 
England  in  association  witli  her. 

Not  concurring  in  the  supposition,  however,  he  (Mr.  A.)  would  not 
reason  from  it.  But  he  insisted  that  England,  despicable  as  she  was  de- 
scribed in  strength,  might  be  trodden  into  war.  The  worm,  trodden  on, 
will  turn,  and,  feeble  as  it  is,  may  sting.  He  (Mr.  A.)  assumed  that  if 
we  terminated  discussion,  seized  the  entire  subject  in  controversy,  and 
this,  too,  accompanied  by  great,  however  just,  vituperation  of  England  in 
our  public  councils,  England,  in  all  her  imbecility,  and  however  signal  the 
indiscretion,  will  be  exasperated  into  war.  Let  us  suppose  this,  and  that 
the  first  result  will  be  to  realize  the  luminous  conception  of  the  Senator  from 
Ohio,  that  the  English  fleets,  in  place  of  agglomerating  on  our  coasts,  as 
might  have  been  expected,  will,  at  the  first  onset  of  war,  take  to  their 
winged  heels,  and  huddle  for  detence  around  the  mother  country  and  the 
colonies.  Even  in  this  view, and  assuming  they  were  never  to  turn  again, 
we  must  still  make  provision  for  defence,  as  if  they  were  at  any  lime  to 
be  expected  on  our  shores.  Well,  excluding  from  calculation  the  large 
consideration  of  naval  and  maritime  armaments,  what  is  the  reasonable 
estimate  of  the  provision  for  land  security  and  operations  which  will  be 
required  ?  He  preferred  (Mr.  A.  said)  to  substitute  the  estimates  of  the 
honorable  Senator  from  South  Carolina  for  his  own.  His  estimate  was 
for  seven  armios,  which  would  be  required,  to  be  composed  of  not  fewer 
than  two  hundred  thousand  men.  To  these  was  to  be  added  (Mr.  A.  said) 
a  consideration  peculiar  to  our  forms  of  force.  Regular  force  we  could 
have  to  only  a  moderate  extent.  We  would  have  to  depend  on  draughts 
of  citizens  for  periods  of  three,  six — let  it  be  twelve  months.  A  force  of 
this  kinu  was  known,  in  its  wastefulness,  and  the  expense  attending  fre- 
quency 01  change  and  distant  removal,  to  involve  a  much  larger  propor- 
tionate cost  v'lan  any  other.  The  provision  must  be  for  the  expense  of  a 
considerably  arger  force  than  two  hundred  thousand  men,  admitting  these 
to  be  sufficien  .  Whence  were  the  resources  for  this  and  other  expendi- 
tures to  come  ?  ThtJ  resource  from  customs  must  be  Tiearly  cut  off  in  the 
inevitable  interruptions  to  commerce.  Direct  taxes,  excises,  loans,  must 
be  tht;  dependence.  Whence  was  lo  be  the  resource  lo  pay  these,  if  our 
markets  for  a  great  part  abroad  were  to  be  cut  off,  and  the  portion,  or  the 
proportion  of  the  products  of  our  industry  which  might  reach  market,  by 
tne  effect  of  insurance  and  the  loss  from  indirect  communication,  to  be 
greatly  impaired? 

The  expense,  every  one  knew,  must  be  supplied  by  loans  If,  from 
the  sources  of  taxation,  enough  could  be  derived  to  pay  the  interest 
on  loans,  and  so  sustain  ihe  credit  of  the  Government,  that  was  the 
best  to  be  ex|)ected.  We  should  be  precluded,  from  various  circum- 
stances not  necessary  to  be  adverted  to,  from  efi'ecting  loans  to  any  ex- 
tent abroad.  The  reliance  must  be  on  domestic  resources.  Flow  long 
could  we  stand  this?  The  estimate  of  Mr.  Gallatin  is,  that  the  expendi- 
ture must  be  seventy-seven  million  dollars  a  year;  fifteen  or  eighteen 
millions  to  be  raised  by  taxes,  sixty  millions  or  more  by  loans.  The  Sen- 
ator from  South  Carolina  thinks  these  estimates  too  low.  That  (Mr.  A. 
said)  was  his  own  distinct  and  well-considered  opinion.  But  suppose  the 
estimates  correct,  how  long  would  our  capacity  of  standing  up  to  the  con- 
test last,  or  with  what  results  ?  The  conflict  must  be  expected  to  be  en- 
during, as  neither  party  was  a  Power  to  '     subdued.    The  Power  that, 


14 


for  a  great  part  of  twenty  years,  a  portion  of  the  time  with  the  resources 
of  all  Europe  at  his  control,  withstood  the  hostility  of  Napoleon  without 
succumbing,  could  not  be  expected  speedily  to  quail  in  our  conflict.  Our 
loans  to  sustain  the  war,  after  a  short  period,  must  be  drawn  entirely  from 
banks.  Aflbrding  loans  to  the  amount  of  sixty-two  millions  a  year,  (Mr. 
Gallatin's  calculation,)  our  banks  must  speedily  become  unable  to  sustain 
a  specie  basis.  Our  Governments,  Federal  and  State,  as  in  England  after 
the  trials  of  1797,  would  find  themselves  constrained  to  authorize  the  de- 
parture from  a  specie  basis.  We  should  then  have  the  rush  of  the  unre- 
sisted paper  system — not  the  paper  system  of  the  war  of  1812,  when  we 
paid  forty  per  cent,  on  loans,  but  of  the  war  of  tlni  Revolution,  when  pa- 
per alone,  depreciated  past  computation,  was  the  only  medium  of  ex- 
change and  standard  of  value. 

In  proportion  to  the  depreciation  of  the  currency  and  the  multiplication 
of  Government  demands  for  loans,  the  amount  of  loans  required  nnist 
augment  with  each  year.  To  what  must  the  amount  swell  in  a  few  years? 
When  peace  came,  besides  that  crudest  of  all  the  trials  through  which  a 
social  community  can  pass,  the  restoration  of  a  ruined  currency  to  credit, 
what  would  be  the  amount  of  debt  we  should  have  to  meet  with  provis- 
ion? The  Senator  from  South  Carolina  says  seven  hundred  and  fifty 
million  dollars  for  ten  yer.rs  of  war.  Let  this  be  the  amount.  How  are 
you  to  meet  it?  Revenue  from  commerce  will  have  passed  away.  Man- 
ufactures, coerced  by  the  denial  of  external  supply,  will  have  covered  the 
land,  to  exclude  any  other  than  the  most  penurious  supply  of  revenue 
from  the  custom-house.  Your  resources  to  pay  the  interest  of  this  debt 
in  peace,  (not  the  debt,)  as  to  pay  it  in  war,  must  be  direct  tax  and  the 
hateful  excise — excise  mainly  on  manufactures.  You  will  not  ho  able  to 
break  up  or  reduce  to  proportion  the  prevalence  of  the  manufacturing 
system.  It  will  have  found  its  unnatural  expansion  in  the  nnavoiciable 
incitement  of  war,  in  the  unavoidable  incitement  of  your  pledged  and 
committed  legislation.  You  will  be  unable  to  break  it  up,  from  its  extent. 
The  attempt  would  induce  convulsion.  You  will  be  forbidden  to  make  the 
attempt,  for  your  pledges  will  be  a  bridle  on  you.  Our  whole  economical 
system,  ^vith  our  whole  financial  system,  which  depends  on  it,  will  have 
undergone  convulsion,  overthrow,  revolution — convulsion  unappeasable, 
revolution  to  which  no  remedy  can  be  brought. 

But  this  (said  Mr.  A.)  was  far  ''rom  the  worst  view  of  tlie  mischief  that 
was  to  come.  We  could  get  on  with  an  economical  system  in  derange- 
ment, a  financial  system  perverted  and  in  disorder ;  but  what  was  to  come 
to  our  social  system  ?  The  war  would  last  long.  It  would  wax  fierce.  In 
proportion  to  the  duration  and  the  fierceness  would  be  the  change  which 
always  came  from  long  war  in  the  temper  of  the  people.  The  effect  was 
as  inevitable  as  the  progression  of  the  seasons — a  moral  law.  The  mili- 
tary would  take  the  place  of  the  civil  spirit — the  military  of  the  civil  men. 
The  proneness  of  the  people  to  abasement  to  military  success,  the  pro- 
clivity of  military  success  to  ab'-se — trade  winds  were  not  more  inevitable 
and  regular.  In  protracted  war,  contempt  of  law  became  the  law.  When 
the  military  men  wanted  to  supplant  the  civil  administration  in  the  first 
French  revolution,  the  cry  was.  "  Throw  the  lawyers  into  the  river."  This 
cry  carried  every  thing.  Arms  and  laws  do  not  flourish  together.  Among 
arms  the  laws  are  silent,  says  the  adage.  The  Senator  from  South  Caro- 
lina has  supposed  that  we  should  have  the  general  of  the  army  of  Texas 


content 
Marius 


I 


le  resources 
'■on  without 
iflict.  Our 
itirely  from 
year,  (Mr. 
5  to  sustain 
gland  after 
rize  the  de- 
f  the  iinre- 
wheii  we 
>  when  pa- 
lun  of  ex- 

'tiphcation 
lired  must 
few  years? 
[I»  which  a 
y  to  credit, 
th  provis- 
arid  fifty 
How  are 
'y.     Man- 
'vered  the 
f  revenue 
this  debt 
"f  and  the 
ho  able  to 
ufacturing 
avoidable 
dged  and 
its  extent, 
make  the 
Jonotnical 
will  have 
pea.sable, 

chief  that 
derange- 
!  to  come 
fierce.  In 
?e  which 
ffect  was 
'he  mili- 
ivil  men. 
the  pro- 
levitable 
When 
the  first 
••"  This 
Among 
h  Caro- 
f  Texas 


m^ 


15 

contending  with  the  general  of  the  army  of  Canada  for  the  first  magistracy. 
Marius  and  Sylla — Ca;sar  and  Pompey.  Perhaps  so.  But  suppose  things 
not  so  bad  ;  that  our  generals,  in  place  of  rending  their  country  by  arms, 
submit  in  war  and  after  war  to  the  forms  of  election — take  office  from  the 
hands  of  the  people.  Is  a  military  ascendency  less  inevitable  ?  Have  not 
our  people,  as  in  all  the  popular  States  of  which  history  gives  us  any 
record,  already  instructed  us  in  the  caiastroplie  ?  Will  they  have  any  other 
than  military  men  in  high  office — with  the  spirit  of  command,  and  con- 
tempt of  civil  control,  which  defines  the  real  and  eminent  military  man? 
If  this  were  to  be  a  war,  then,  as  it  had  been  said  it  would  be,  between 
the  republican  and  monarchical  principles,  the  conflict  would  be  at  home — 
among  ourselves ;  and  the  first  were  certain  to  succumb,  and  the  last  to  be 
triumphant.  He  (Mr.  A.)  had  heard  the  suggestion  that,  under  the  severe 
pressure  of  the  distress  in  the  continuance  of  this  war,  the  Union  might 
give  way — break  up.  He  did  not  concur  in  this  apprehension.  War 
lagmg,  lii!  honorable  termination  had  been  reached,  our  people  would 
never  sunder.  But  the  case  was  ditl'erent  entirely  when,  in  the  restoration 
of  peace,  a  military  dynasty,  in  the  forms  of  our  republican  institutions, 
would  supervene.  Then  the  heart  of  the  patriot  would  be  turned  to  dis- 
ruption, the  impulse  at  once  of  incontrollable  feeling,  and  the  dictate  of  in- 
violable duty. 

Such  (Mr.  A.  said)  were  some  of  the  consequences — they  were  only  a 
part — which  might  come,  whicii  he  believed  in  his  inmost  heart,  to  a  great 
extent,  would  come,  from  this  war  proposed  for  Oregon,  if  it  occurred. 
What  were  to  be  the  compensations,  independently  of  these  ulterior  con- 
siderations, for  the  ordinary  sacrifices  in  blood  and  expenditure  which  the 
war  would  involve?  Not  Oregon.  That  was  too  small  a  thing  to  think 
of.  Still  less  a  part  of  Oregon,  or  the  use  of  a  river,  (the  Columbia,)  with 
a  hundred  and  twenty-five  miles  of  available  stream,  and  fifteen  miles  of 
nearly  impracticable  and  absolutely  irremovable  shoal  at  the  mouth  of  it. 
The  compensations  were  to  be  the  occupation  of  the  English  territorial 
possessions  in  our  neighborhood.  Wellj  suppose  these  occupied,  as  prob- 
ably, not  certainly,  they  would  be  in  the  progress  of  the  war — what  were 
we  to  do  with  them  on  the  restoration  of  peace,  supposing  fwhat  was  im- 
possible) that  we  were  not  to  restore  '  'u  as  the  indispensable  conditions 
of  peace  ?  Retain  them  as  pavts  of  our  Confederacy  ?  That  would  be 
the  signal  for  the  dissolution  of  the  Confederacy,  which  would  break  to 
pieces,  too,  in  no  long  time,  under  the  weight,  even  if  this  were  not  to 
prove  the  signal  of  dissolution.  And  was  it  certain  that  these  provinces 
would  be  willing  to  come  into  our  Confederacy  ?  They  had  been  fostered 
in  attachment  to  monarchical  as  we  to  ropublican  institutions.  Were  we 
to  force  their  inclinations,  put  our  institutions  on  them  as  a  yoke  ?  That 
would,  indeed,  be  the  policy  of  a  part  of  our  people,  but  not,  it  must  be  pre- 
sumed, of  the  majority.  Were  we  to  restore  these  possessions  ?  Then, 
where  was  to  be  the  compensation  for  all  the  enormous  cost  in  blood  and 
treasure  of  the  acquirement  ?  Was  it  to  go  in  satisfaction  for  that  worth- 
less part  of  Oregon — the  only  part  that  England,  was  not  ready  to  surren- 
der to  us  to  day?  Or  were  we  to  establish  these  British  provinces,  if  we 
did  not  wish  to  take  them,  or  they  did  not  wish  to  come  to  us,  as  an  inde- 
pendent republican  confederacy  ?  Then  the  cost  of  suffering  and  blood  of 
our  people  would  go  to  their  establishment,  as  a  great  neighbor,  and  there- 
fore rival,  in  place  of  a  foreign  Power. 


16 


He  (Mr.  A.)  had  now  given  a  sincere  expression  of  his  views  of  the 
policy  of  asserting  a  claim  to  all  Oregon.  There  was  a  topic  in  connexion, 
to  which  he  was  reluctant,  and  yet  thought  it  necessary,  to  advert.  It 
had  been  brought  into  the  debate  on  the  other  side  of  the  chamber,  and 
this  put  him  at  liberty  to  make  the  allusion  to  it.  The  authority  of  the 
Baltimore  Convention  had  been  openly  invoked,  in  the  discussion,  as  one 
of  the  appropriate  means  to  influence  it.  It  was  proper  that  the  people 
should  be  made  acquainted  with  the  fact,  and  with  the  fearful  bearing  of 
this  appeal.  The  Baltimore  Convention  !  What  was  it  ?  The  authority 
of  an  association  unknown  to  the  institutions  of  the  country,  made  the 
subject  of  appeal  to  control  the  legislation  of  the  country  !  This  body, 
really  self-appointed,  or  nearly  so,  convened  for  an  alleged  specific  object, 
to  carry  into  eflect  an  assumed  public  sentiment  in  relation  to  that  ob- 
ject. Its  first  proceeding  had  been  to  discard  the  admitted  public  senti- 
ment which  it  purported  to  nave  met  to  effectuate.  Its  notorious  oouw© 
of  proceeding  had  been,  not  to  receivtt  but  to  make  a  public  sentiment,  in 
substitution  of  that  which  it  professed  to  have  been  sent  to  execute  ;  and 
then  to  raise  political  issues  which  might  be  inflamed  in  aid  of  this  opera- 
tion. A  junto,  with  no  authority  of  any  kind,  or  acting  in  admitted  con- 
tradiction and  violation  of  its  professed  authority,  had  been  successful  in 
dictating  i's  most  important  election  to  the  country ;  and  its  authority  was 
nov/  employed,  on  the  prestige  of  that  success,  to  dictate  the  legislation  of 
the  country  on  a  subject  of  the  most  vital  importance.  This  was  the 
first  open  avowal  the  country  had  ever  known  of  Jacobinism  in  its  halls 
of  legislation.     It  was  yet  to  be  seen  how  the  avowal  would  be  received. 

A  supposed  peculiar  Western  interest  on  this  subject  of  Oregon  had 
been  adduced  to  explain  the  propensity  to  extreme  measures  manifested 
in  that  quarter  of  the  country,  and  by  its  representatives  here.  He  (Mr. 
A.)  did  not  ascribe  the  vehemence  of  this  propensity  to  the  influence  of 
any  such  selfish  consideration.  But  he  did  ascribe  it  to  a  peculiarity  of 
Western  temperament,  the  incident,  perhaps,  of  their  stage  of  social  con- 
dition. The  people  were  notoriously  brave ;  but  this  bravery  ran  into 
recklessness  of  all  consequences  in  controversy  with  foreign  Powers.  They 
were  as  undoubtedly  generous  ;  but  they  had  the  quality  too  often  found 
in  alliance  with  spirit  and  generosity — impatience  of  resistance  to  their 
views,  and  the  disposition  to  domineer  over  it.  He  (Mr.  A.)  admitted  his 
indulgence  of  an  extreme  anxiety  on  the  subject  of  this  Western  tempera- 
ment, not  in  relation  to  the  present  instance  only  of  its  display,  but  the 
large  future  which  was  before  us ;  the  political  power  of  the  country  being 
destined,  probably,  to  pass  to  that  region,  before  this  temperament  passed 
away  from  it,  under  the  influence  of  its  only  corrective,  diffused  education. 
Rumination  on  this  topic,  he  had  to  confess,  had  for  some  time  kept  him 
in  terror. 

Yes,  "  westward  the  star  of  empire  holds  its  way."  The  fact  was  as 
true  as  the  expression  was  poetical.  Great  results  were  probably  to  come. 
His  (Mr.  A.'s)  prayer  to  Heaven  was.j  that,  before  this  planet  of  power 
culminated,  its  beam  might  so  refine  as  not  to  wither  our  enjoyment  of 
freedom  at  home,  and  not  to  aff'right  other  climes  and  times,  which  a  tem- 
pered brightness  in  our  example  might  lure  to  the  admiration  and  the 
adoption  of  popular  institutions.  r      .        ,    , 


l,!' 


.wi 


